Published papers
Rosato A. and Tymula A. (2024) A novel experimental test of truthful bidding in second-price auctions with real objects, Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics, 111
Kettlewell N. and Tymula A. (2024) Heritability across different domains of trust, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 219:549-563
Pastore C., Schurer S., Tymula A., Fuller N, Caterson I. (2023) Economic Preferences and Obesity: Evidence from a Clinical Lab-in-Field Experiment, Health Economics, 32:2147-2167
Berger A. and Tymula A. (2022) Controlling ambiguity: The illusion of control in decision-making under risk and ambiguity [short poster presentation] Journal of Risk and Uncertainty 10.1007/s11166-022-09399-4
Cheung S. L., Tymula A., Wang X. (2022) Present Bias for Monetary and Dietary Rewards: Evidence from Chinese Teenagers, Experimental Economics, 25: 1202–1233
Guo J. and Tymula A. (2021) Waterfall illusion in risky choice, European Economic Review, 139
Tymula A. and Wang X. (2021) Increased risk-taking, not loss tolerance, drives adolescents’ propensity to gamble more under peer observation, [supplement], Journal of Economic Behaviour and Organization, 188:439-457
Weinrabe A., Chung H., Tymula A., Tranand J., Hickie I. (2020) Economic Rationality in Young People with Emerging Mood Disorder, Journal of Neuroscience, Economics, and Psychology
Tymula (2019) Adolescents are more impatient and inconsistent, not more risk-taking when observed by peers – a comprehensive study of adolescent behavior under peer observation, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organisation, 166:735-750
Chung, H., Glimcher. P.W., Tymula, A. (2019) An Experimental Comparison of Risky and Riskless Choice – Limitations of Prospect Theory and Expected Utility Theory, American Economic Journal: Micro, 11(3):34-67
Rosato A. and Tymula A. (2019) Loss Aversion and Competition in Vickrey Auctions: Money Ain’t No Good, Games and Economic Behavior, 115: 188-208
Published book chapters
Tymula and Wang. 2025. Self-control in Elgar Encyclopedia of Behavioural and Experimental Economics, 359-362
Tymula A. (2019). Brain Morphometry for Economists: How do Brain Volume Constraints Affect Our Choices? in Biophysical Measurement in Experimental Social Science Research, Foster (Eds.), ELSEVIER
Other writing
Tymula A. (2016) Financial gamble? My brain made me do it. The Conversation
- featured on Scientific American Blog Network
- written for the Young Minds of the 2014 USA Science and Engineering Festival
Tymula A. (2014) Explainer: neuroeconomics, where science and economics meet. The Conversation
Book review of After Phrenology: Neural Reuse and the Interactive Brain, Michael L. Anderson. The MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, USA (2014) in Journal of Economic Psychology, Volume 51, December 2015, p. 279–280
Papers under review
Cheung S., Tymula, A. and Wang X. (2025) A meta-analysis of quasi-hyperbolic discounting [short poster presentation] revision requested from Management Science
This paper reports a meta-analysis of 86 studies of the two parameters of quasi-hyperbolic (β-δ ) discounting, the dominant model of self-control failures in behavioural economics. The central tenet of the model is that decision-makers have a “present-bias”, β , for immediate rewards, on top of standard exponential discounting of the future, δ . After correcting for selective reporting, we obtain a meta-analytic estimate of β for money of 0.938, with 95% confidence interval [0.905, 0.972]. For non-monetary rewards, our estimate of β is 0.750, with 95% confidence interval [0.643, 0.857], and there is no evidence of selective reporting. We find that present bias for real effort, while stronger than for money, is weaker than for other rewards such as real consumption.
Akbari M., Alladi V., Je H. and Tymula A (2025) Ambiguity vulnerability , revision requested from Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization
We introduce and empirically investigate a novel concept: ambiguity vulnerability. Ambiguity vulnerability posits that individuals exhibit greater risk aversion in their decisions when faced with a background (beyond an individual’s control) prospect that has
unknown probabilities (background ambiguity) than one with known probabilities (background risk). We find empirical evidence of ambiguity vulnerability, with individuals investing 11% less when faced with background ambiguity compared to background risk. Ambiguity vulnerability explains 36.9% of total uncertainty vulnerability, suggesting that focusing solely on background risk may understate the effect of background uncertainty. We empirically explore the relationship between utility shape and risk and ambiguityvulnerability and find that participants exhibiting both decreasing and non-decreasing absolute risk aversion display risk vulnerability.
The Divisive Normalization (DN) function has been described as a “canonical neural computation” in the brain that achieves efficient representations of sensory and choice stimuli. Recent theoretical work indicates that it efficiently encodes a specific class of Pareto-distributed stimuli. Does the brain shift to different encoding functions in other types of environments, or is there evidence for DN encoding in other types of environments? In this paper, using a within-subject choice experiment, we show evidence of the latter. Our subjects made decisions in two distinct choice environments with choice sets either drawn from a Pareto distribution or from a uniform distribution. Our results indicate that subjects’ choices are better described by a divisive coding strategy in both environments. Moreover, subjects appeared to calibrate a DN function to match, as closely as possible, the actual statistical properties of each environment. These results suggest that the nervous system may be constrained to use divisive representations under all conditions.
Cheung S., MacGibbon K., Milin-Byrne A., Tymula A. (2024) Quasi-exponential discounting , revision requested from AEJ: Micro
Alternatives to the standard model of time preference typically relax the assumption of an exponential discount function while retaining the framework of discounted utility. We report novel behavioural data inconsistent with this approach. Illustrating this, we estimate highly significant “present bias”, despite our data exhibiting stationarity. The paradox is resolved by relaxing discounted utility itself to allow discounting to be context dependent. We propose quasi-exponential discounting (QED), a fixed penalty applied to all episodes of delay, as a particularly simple model of this type and show that it provides an excellent approximation to the best fit to our data.
Behavioral economic theory attributes the inability to lose weight to impatience and present bias, assuming they lead to excessive food consumption and inadequate exercise. We use data from a large-scale lab-in-field study that tracks 293 participants with obesity who attempted to improve their health as part of a 12-month randomized controlled trial conducted in a clinical setting. Consistent with behavioral economic theory, we find that trial participants who are less impatient are more likely to complete the trial. However, there is no evidence that participants who are less impatient or less present-biased are more successful in reducing body fat or weight. We replicate that a person’s impatience does not predict their intended weight change over a period of one year using a nationally representative data of 6,118 adults with obesity. Our results suggest that obesity is not just a behavioral condition. Treatments that focus on correcting individual’s impatience or self-control alone may not be the right approach for weight loss in clinically-relevant populations.
Discrimination leads to disadvantageous financial, labor market, academic, and social outcomes for those affected, driven by the decisions of those who discriminate. Inherent in the experience of discrimination is unfair treatment but little is known about whether experiencing unfair treatment subsequently alters own decision-making in unrelated contexts. Using a novel experiment, we examine how experiencing unfair treatment affects investment decisions. We introduced unfair treatment by varying the probability of receiving a small performance bonus (5% vs 95% chance) that determines participants’ relative earning ranking. We found that after experiencing unfair treatment (without explicit discrimination), participants invested less in ambiguous assets but their investments in risky assets remained unchanged. We further explored whether wealth, gender, and previous experience of discrimination mitigate this reduction in invetment. Our findings highlight the broader economic consequences of unfair treatment, emphasising its potential to shape financial decision-making.
While women generally take fewer financial risks than men, the reasons remain unclear. Inspired by the efficient coding literature, we hypothesize that women’s lower financial risk tolerance is due to lower reference points. We measured financial reference points in a representative US sample of 579 adults using a range of unincentivized and incentivized methods. In line with our predictions, we found that women have lower reference points, regardless of how they are measured, and that this translates to lower financial risk tolerance. Our results suggest that, rather than being endowed with different risk attitudes, men and women may have different reference points. We discuss possible reasons for this and its implications for policy.
Tymula A. and Yamada H. (2024) Neural and behavioral probability weighting function
Recent theoretical models challenge the existence of a probability weighting function as it was traditionally conceived in Prospect Theory in ways that are not straightforward to test using choice data. This study transcends these constraints by directly observing probability distortions in the brain, free from utility confounds. Utilizing a unique dataset comprising 64,175 decision trials and 78,067 neural measurement trials, we pinpoint neural activity (a basic biological decision processing unit) that exclusively encodes probability, independent of payoff magnitudes. Our results demonstrate that neural probability weighting functions diverge from those estimated behaviorally under conventional assumptions. Furthermore, incorporating a biologically realistic utility function enhances our ability to reconstruct neural probability weighting from observed choices, offering direct biological evidence on the bases of economic decision-making.
Kettlewell N. and Tymula A. (2024) Heritability of different types of overconfidence
Incorrect estimation of own absolute and relative abilities is common and can have detrimental effects on a person’s educational, social, employment, and financial outcomes. It is not yet fully understood from where interpersonal differences in overconfidence emerge. In this paper, we estimate the heritability of two types of overconfidence, overestimation and overplacement, in a sample of 1120 twins. We find that the genetic heritability of both types of overconfidence is about 19% and that most of the interindividual variation in overconfidence is due to individual-specific environmental factors.
Kettlewell N., Tymula, A. and Yoo H. (2023) The heritability of economic preferences
We investigate the heritability of risk, uncertainty, and time preferences using a large-scale field experiment with adult twins, complemented by a comprehensive meta-analysis of prior studies. Our research introduces a novel empirical approach that integrates behavioral genetics with structural econometrics, enabling us to directly quantify the heritability of economic preference parameters, without relying on proxy measures. Our incentive-compatible experiment is the first to simultaneously elicit all three types of preferences within the same individuals in a twin study. Our findings reveal a stronger genetic influence on risk and uncertainty preferences than previously reported. We demonstrate that conventional proxy measures for preferences and simplified structural models tend to overstate the influence of unique environmental factors, highlighting the need for more nuanced methodological approaches.
Kettlewell N., Levy J., Tymula A., Wang X. (2023) The gender reference point gap
Studies have frequently found that women are more risk averse than men. In this paper, we depart from usual practice in economics that treats risk attitude as a primitive, and instead adopt a neuroeconomic approach where risk attitude is determined by the reference point which can be easily estimated using standard econometric methods. We then evaluate whether there is a gender difference in the reference point, explaining the gender difference in risk aversion observed using traditional approaches. In our study, women make riskier choices less frequently than men. Compared to men, we find that women on average have a significantly lower reference point. By acknowledging the reference point as a potential source of gender inequality, we can begin a new discussion on how to address this important issue.
Less – traditional research output
Decision-making and ageing exhibit at the Museum of the National Academy of Sciences in Washington, DC (part of the Life Lab exhibit)
- on display May 2012 – September 2018